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RECENT CASES
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-PAYABLE TO ORDER OF ESTATE OF DECEASED
PERSON-NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS

LAW OF

1901

In Bacher v. City National Bank of Philadelphia,347 Pa. 80, 31 A 2d 725,
it is held that a check payable to the order of "Estate of Anna Hoffman" is not
a check payable to a fictitious person and is not therefore payable to bearer.

This is a case of first impression in Pennsylvania. The defendant asserting
that the check was a bearer instrument invoked ch. I, Art. 1, Sec. 9, of the
Negotiable Instruments Law of 1901, P. L. 194, 56 P. S. 14: "The instrument
is payable to bearer . . . 3. when it is payable to the order of a fictitious or non-

existing person, and such fact was known to the person making it so payable;
or ... 4. when the name of the payee does not purport to be the name of any
p rson."

The court in the present case recognized that other states-Minn.,

Mo., N. Y., and Miss.-have looked upon instruments payable to the order of
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the estate of a deceased person as payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting person within the meaning of such section of a corresponding statute.
(Georgia also adopts this view. Loveless v. Carten, 64 Ga. App. 54.) The
court, however, preferred to align itself with the courts of some other statesMass., Mich., Iowa, Ill., Ky., Cal., S. C., Fla.-and declared that in Pennsylvania, in cases under this section, the guiding consideration has always been the
intent of the drawer of the instrument in inserting the name of the payee. Snyder
v. Corn Exchange National Bank, 221 Pa. 599; National Union Fire Insurance
Co. v. Mellon National Bank, 276 Pa. 212.
The drawer here-a building and loan association seeking to pay a debt
owed the plaintiff's intestate-certainly did not intend that the checks be payable to bearer. Justice Stern, who wrote the majority opinion, pointed out that
it is usual to personify the estate of a decedent and to use the term "estate", when
what is actually meant is the legal representative of the estate. And according
to ch. 1, art. 1, sec. 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 56 P. S. 12: "(The
instrument) may be drawn payable to the order of

. . .

6. the holder of an

office for the time being."
Justices Drew, Stearne, and Patterson dissented on other grounds, in this
case, but all agreed that the checks were not instruments made payable to bearer
under sec. 9.
In Snyder v. Corn Exchange National Bank, supra, it was said that "fictitious" refers to one either non-existent or, being in existence, one who was
never intended to have any right to the sum represented by the instrument. At
page 606 the court said: "The intent of the drawer of the check, in inserting the
name of a payee, is the sole test of whether the payee is a fictitious person."
In 14 Harv. L. R. 422, 443, n. 3, Professor Ames calls Judge Brewster's
remark in 10 Yale L. J. 84, 89, that a note payable to the order of a decedent's
estate is payable to bearer because of sec. 9

. . .

3. a "startling suggestion",

and adds that "it is a perversion of language to call the payee in such a note a
fictitious or non-existing person."
In the present case the court cited five cases from other jurisdictions as sustaining the contrary doctrine: Kluczny v. Matz et al., 244 NW 407 (Minn.);
In re Ziegenhein, 187 SW 893 (Mo.); Lewisohn v. Kent & Stanley Co., 33 N.
Y. S. 826; Scott et al. v. Parker, 5 N. Y. S. 753; and Tittle v. Thomas, 30
Miss. 122.
The Kluczny case held that a note payable to the estate of a named incompetent person is in legal effect payable to bearer. This decision is in point, as
an analogy to a note payable to the estate of a named decedent could well be
drawn.
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In re Ziegenhein held that where drafts were payable "to estate of Henry
Ziegenhein", the court could not require indorsement by the petitioner or anyone else on these drafts, since it would thus be requiring an unnecessary act;-in
effect, a holding that the drafts were payable to bearer.
In Lewisohn v. Kent & Stanley Co., the court held that the "note" r'eferred
to should not be regarded as such since payable "to the order of the estate of" a
decedent, and so payable to a fictitious person. It held that the instrument was
not a valid note, not that it was a bearer instrument. The case was not a strong
one, however, for the court said, "Though we should regard it as neither a
promissory note nor negotiable, there is a statement in the affidavit of the existence of a valid indebtedness in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant."
Scott et al. v. Parker held flatly that a note payable "to the order of the
estate of B" was payable to bearer.
In Tittle v. Thomas an instrument payable "to the estate of Benjamin
Thomas, deceased", was held invalid as a promissory note for want of a sufficient designation of the payee. This was similar to the Lewishon holding in
that the instrument was thus held to be not a valid note, as contrasted with a
holding that it was a bearer instrument. Moreovr, the court added that parol
evidence as to the intention of the maker would not be admissible.
The effect of the Pennsylvania decision is that a proposed purchaser of a
negotiable instrument must, at his peril, it the instrument is payable other than
to bearer, contact the maker and learn what his intent was in inserting the name
of the payee.
By the decision in this case Pennsylvania has placed itself with those states
which have taken the more practical view of negotiable instruments and given
due regard to the intent of the maker. This view protects the interests of beneficiaries in estates, who are forced to rely on the integrity of the estates' representatives. In our opinion this decision represents a praise-worthy variance from
the usual Pennsylvania conservatism.
GLORIA A.

HAGGERTY
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAw-SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT OF 1940JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ACTION OF DRAFT BOARD--HABEAS CORPUS

Catanzaro registered undtr the Selective Service law and claimed exemp-

tion as a regular and duly ordained minister of religion (Jehovah's Witnesses).
His local Draft Board refused to classify him as such, and its decision was affirmed by the County Appeal Board. When ordered to report for induction, he
did not obey, and consequently was arrested on a charge of violation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, Sec. 311. He
filed his petition and applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court, alleging that the selective service tribunals acted arbitrarily and
capriciously, without regard to the evidence and contrary to law, and that he was
denied a fair hearing. The court refused to issue the writ and dismissed the
petition. Affirmed. Two judges dissented. Held: A review through habeas
corpus proceedings may not be had when the registrant fails to report for induction in accordance with his Board's order and the terms of the law.Ex Parte
Catanzaro, 3 Cir., 138 F. 2d 100 (Sept. 23, 1943)
The question of how to obtain a judicial review of the action of local draft
boards and appeal boards has arisen in many recent cases. Section 10 (a) (2)
of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 50 U.S.C.A. Appendix, Sec.
310 (a)

(2), provides:

". .

. such local (draft) boards . .. shall have power

within their respective jurisdictions to hear and determine, subject to the right of
appeal to the appeal boards ...,all questions or claims with respect to inclusion
for, or exemption or deferment from, training and service under this Act of all
individuals within the jurisdiction of such local boards. The decisions of such
local boards shall be final except where an appeal is authorized in accordance
with such rules and regulations as the President may prescribe." The act confers
no jurisdiction upon the courts. Shimola v. Local Board, D. C. N. D. Ohio, 40
Fed. Supp. 808. Petition of Soberman, D. C. E. D. N. Y., 37 Fed. Supp. 522.
United States v. Grierne, 3 Cir., 128 F. 2d 811 (1942): "The courts have uniformly ruled that the findings whereon draft boards base their decisions are final
and may not be disturbed by the courts, unless it appears that the person affected
thereby has not been afforded a full and fair hearing or unless the members of the
local draft board acted contrary to law or abused the discretion reposed in them
by the statute." The courts evolved a similar rule under the Selective Draft Act of
1917, 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix, Sec. 201 et seq. Arbitman v. Woodside, 4 Cir.,
258 F. 441. United States Ex Rel. Pascher v. Kinkhead, 3 Cir., 250 F. 692.
In Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board No. 1, 3 Cir., 130 F. 2d 610
(1942), the registrant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and for an injunction to restrain the board from ordering him to camp until disposition of the
issues sought to be raised by the writ. It was held that the question of the regis-
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trant's classification was one of fact and not reviewable by certiorari. Most attempts to obtain a judicial review, however, have been made in defense to a
prosecution for failure to comply with the induction order. It may be regarded
now as well settled that a draft board's administrative acts may not Be attacked
collaterally in defending a prosecution under the act for failure to report. United
States v. Grieme, 3 Cir., 128 F. 2d 811 (1942). United States v. Bowles, 3 Cir.,
131 F. 2d 818 (1942). United States v. Kauten, 2 Cir., 133 F. 2d 703 (1943).
Fletcher v. United States, 5 Cir., 129 F. 2d 263 (1942). In each of these cases
it was suggested by dictum that the proper method of obtaining a judicial review was by habeas .corpus. United States v. Grieme, supra: ". . . if a local
draft board acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner, or denies a registrant a
full and fair hearing, the latter, although bound to comply with the board's order,
may, by a writ of habeas corpus, obtain a judicial determination as to the propriety of the board's conduct and the character of the hearing which it afforded."
United States v. Bowles, supra: "... the defendant would have been able to
secure a review of the legality of the board's order by means of a writ of habeas
corpus had he submitted to induction into the military forces." United States v.
Kauten, supra: ". . . the only procedure by which an inductee might procure a
judicial review of such an order or of an improper classification was by applying
for a writ of habeas corpus after he had submitted to induction." Drumheller v.
Berks County Local Board No. 1, supra: "Drumheller should have delivered
himself to the authorities. . . He then could have raised the question by writ of
habeas corpus. . ." It is important to note that these dicta required compliance
with the induction order. In United States Ex Rel. Phillipsv. Downer, 2 Cir., 135
F. 2d 521 (1943), this method was followed and a review by habeas corpus
proceedings was allowed. "Since the draftee has, therefore, obeyed the law by
responding to the call for induction . . . he has placed himself in the proper position to challenge the legality of his induction."
The principal case has simply transformed these dicta into law, by holding
that the petitioner was not entitled to a review by habeas corpus because he had
not obeyed his induction order. United States v. Kauten, supra, points out the
delegated to an administrative
reason for this rule. Generally, where authority is.
board and its acts made final, the courts will not interfere until the administrative
proceedings have been concluded and all available administrative remedies have
been exhausted. The administrative steps taken by the draft board are not concluded until the draftee is finally accepted or rejected by the Army. "Prior to that
time he has suffered only the inconvenience incident to his status as a party to an
administrative proceeding, the general sort of inconvenience to which parties
customarily submit in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
the National Labor Relations Board, and many other federal and state tribunalS,
including courts of law. The justification for the burden upon the individual of
subjecting him to such proceedings instead of stopping them at the outset by in-
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junctive or other relief in the courts lies in the absence of an alternative consistent with the orderly conduct of the government's business, and in this particular case, in the want of any suitable alternative method of selecting the personnel of a large army." In other words, the Selective Training and Service Act
would not be workable, if the courts could interfere during the administrative
stage or if a registrant were at liberty to disobey his induction order on the
strength of obtaining a review by habeas corpus.
In conclusion it may be said that a judicial review of the action of a draft
board may not be had 1)by certiorari, or 2) in a defense to a prosecution for
violation of the act by failure to report for induction, or 3) by habeas corpus
induction order. A review by habeas corpus
when the petitioner has disobeyed th'e
proceedings may be had when the petitioner has reported for induction.
GILBERT

G.

LUDWIG
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TAXATION-LAND SOLD BY UNITED STATES WITH LEGAL TITLE RETAINEDPURCHASER'S EQUITABLE INTEREST TAXABLE BY STATE

The United States sold an old postoffice site to the Ken Realty Co. Under
the terms of the contract, part of the purchase price was paid down and the balance
was payable in ten annual installments. The purchaser received full possession
and control, was to bear the risk of loss or destruction, and had the right to lease
or even sell parts of the property. The United States retained legal title to secure
payment of the balance of the price, the deed to be given the purchaser on full
payment. The attorney general of the state (Alabama) then declared the property assessable for ad valorem taxation against the Ken Realty Co., which sought
an injunction and a declaratory judgment against the state tax assessor to stop the
assessment against itself of any tax in respect to the property. The district court
dismissed the complaint. On Appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed.
Held: the entire value of the land was taxable to the Realty Co. However, the
Court, by dictum, suggested that the Realty Co. has a taxable interest whose value
is measured each tax year by the value of the whole property diminished by the
amount of the unpaid purchase money. Ken Really Co. v. Johnson, Tax Assessor,
5 Cir., 138 F. 2d 809 (Nov. 29, 1943).
It is well settled that land owned by the United States is exempt from taxation by the state by reason of a mutual immunity implied in the Federal Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,' 4 L. Ed. 579. Van Brocklin v.
Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151, 6 S. Ct. 670, 29 L. Ed. 845. Clallam County v. United
States, 263 U. S. 341, 44 S. Ct. 121, 68 L. Ed. 328. But the question that arises
in this case is what constitutes "ownership" by the United States for the purpose
of this immunity. Is a contract of sale under which legal title is retained such a
conveyance as will render the land taxable against the vendee?
As a general proposition, where land is sold by one private individual to another, it has been uniformly held by the state courts that taxes are assessable
against the "equitable owner" of the land. A vendee in possession under an
executory contract of sale has "equitable title" and is the "equitable owner" for
the purpose of taxation. Hickey et al v. Peck et al., 23 A. 2d 711 (Md. 1942):
"The practice in Maryland is to assess property for taxation to the equitable owner."
Bordner v. Board of Com'rs. of Baca County, 18 P. 2d 323 (Colo., 1932): private person's equity in school lands taxable. Commonwealth v. First Christian
Church, 183 S. W. 943 (Ky., 1916): vendee of church property under conditional contract to purchase was equitable owner and liable for taxes, even though
he was not in possession. Mausoleum Builders of N. 1. v. State Board of Taxes,
etc., 100 A. 263 (N. J., 1916): though legal title had not passed, vendee was
liable for taxes as equitable owner, and could not claim vendor's exemption.
Bowls v. Oklahoma City et al., 104 P. 902 (Okla., 1909): equitable owner is
real.owner for purpose of taxation. Bond v. Brand's Trustee et al., 74 S. W. 673
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(Ky., 1903): to same effect. But a vendee not having an enforceable contract
could not be taxed as equitable owner: Fist6 v. Coggeshall, 47 A. 692 (R. I.,
1900). On the other hand, a vendee in possession, who neglected to procure deed,,
could not avoid taxation on the theory that the equitable owner is not subject
to taxation. City of Philadelphia v. Myers, 102 Pa. Super. 424, 157 A. 13
(1930).

In the analogous cases, however, where the federal government sells land
to a private individual under a conditional contract of sale, it has been held that
the land is not subject to taxation by the state as long as the United States retains
legal title. This doctrine was first, pronounced in the railroad cases. In these
cases, grants of land from the United States to railroads, to aid in the construction of roads, were held exempt from taxation until the costs of surveys had been
paid and the United States had granted patents. Kansas Pacific Railroad Co. v.
Prescott, 16 Wall. 603, 21 L. Ed. 373 (1872). Union Pacific Railroad Co. v
McShane, 22 Wall. 444, 22 L. Ed. 747 (1874). Northern Pacific Railroad Co.
v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600, 6 S. Ct. 201, 29 L. Ed. 477 (1885). These decisions were clearly based on the policy of the federal government at that time,
which was to aid and promote the construction of the roads. A similar policy
influenced the decisions in the homestead cases, where public land was granted
to settlers, and the federal immunity was extended to protect the land from taxation until all had been done or paid which was necessary to entitle the settler to a
formal conveyance. Irwin v. Wright, 258 U. S. 219, 42 S. Ct. 293, 66 L. Ed.
573 (1922). Fron- the railroad cases and the homestead cases, this doctrine wasextended to other cases where no such government policy was present. In United
States v. Milwaukee, 100 F. 829 (1893), the United States sold the old federal
office building to a private person on a conditional sale which reserved legal title
to the vendor to secure the balance due. The United States rented the offices from
the vendee until a new federal building was erected. One-half of the purchase
price had been paid when the vendee was assessed for taxes. It was held that the
land was not taxable so long as the United States retained legal title and any part
of the purchase price remained unpaid. Similarly, in Mint Realty Co. v. Philadelphia, 218 Pa. 104, 66 A. 1130 (1907), the land was held not taxable while
the United States retained legal title. There the United States sold the old mint
site to a private person, who tore down the old building, erected a new building,
and rented offices before he paid the full purchase price and received legal title.
And in Copp v. West Virginia, 69 W. Va. 444, 71 S. E. 580 (1911), the United
States sold the old customs house and postoffice building on a conditional sale.
Again it was held that the vendee was not liable to taxation by the state so long
as the lien in favor of the United States remained unsatisfied. More recently, in
Lincoln County, Ore., et al, v. Pacific Spruce Corp., 9 Cir., 26 F. 2d 435 (1928),
timber lands, sold by a United States agency to a private corporation on a conditional sale, were held not subject to taxation by the state as long as the .federal
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government retained legal title, although it was admitted that the chief value of
the land was the timber which would be removed before the corporation finally
received legal title. All of these cases cited the railroad cases as authority and
relied upon them as establishing the peculiar rule that the equitable owner of
land cannot be taxed if the United States holds legal title.
The instant case has refused to follow this rule that has been developed in
cases where the federal government is the vendor. It chooses instead to follow
the general rule that the "equitable owner" of land is taxable, regardless of who
holds legal title. It points out that the federal government has no continuing interest in the land, such as it did in the railroad cases and the homestead cases.
No federal policy of promotion or protection is involved, and there is no sound
reason for extending the federal immunity for the benefit and special advantage
of the vendee. The government is not fostering or sponsoring a plan or project;
it is merely disposing of land it finds no longer useful; it is seeking to divest itself of title and return the land to the general mass of taxable property in the
state. The "general property right" is in the vendee, who receives all the rents,
issues and profits of the land, while the government retains only a "special property right." Since there is no federal policy of promotion involved, there is
nothing to take the case out of the class of ordinary conditional sales. The beneficial owner of the land should receive no special protection simply because the
vendor is the federal government and not a private individual. If legal title were
allowed to control ,the result would be an injury to the state without benefit to
the United States. It is only fair that the vendee who is enjoying the land pay
taxes to the state. In spite of the precedents to the contrary, the decision in this
case is based on sound reasoning and is well supported by the equities. And although the Circuit Court of Appeals suggested by a dictum that the vendee's
taxable interest is measured by the whole value of the property diminished by the
amount of the unpaid purchase money, this same reasoning and the equities would
seem to support the district court's holding, that the entire value of the land is
taxable to the vendee, since no interest of the United States would be prejudiced
thereby.
GILBERT G. LUDWIG
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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PICKETING

A labor union picketed a cafeteria owned by the respondents in an attempt
to organize it. The respondents conducted the cafeteria without the aid of any
employees. The picketing was "at all times orderly and peaceful." Signs were
carried stating that the respondents were "unfair" to organized labor. Moreover
the pickets told prospective customers that the cafeteria served bad food and that
by patronizing it they were aiding the cause of Fascism. The owner of the cafeteria
sought to restrain the union from further picketing. HELD; Injunction denied.
The union may without special statutory authorization make known the facts of
their dispute and appeal for public support in an orderly and peaceful manner
regardless of the area of immunity as defined by state policy, in view of freedom
of speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. Cafeteria Employees Union,
Etc. v. Angelos, 64 Sup. Ct. 126.
In so holding the Supreme Court followed the precedent set by them in the
case of Senn v. Tile Layers' Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81
L. Ed. 1229, (1937). There, for the first time the court held where a union
makes known the facts of a labor dispute by picketing, this action is protected by
the freedom of speech clause of the Federal Constitution. It is to be noted however that in that case the court had before it a state statute which sought to restrict
picketing to certain specified instances. In that case just as in the instant case the fact
that none of the employees was a union member or that the establishment being
picketed employed no one outside the owner or members of his family was held to
be immaterial.
The doctrine of the Senn case was followed subsequently in the cases of
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 60 Sup. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093, (1940)
and Carlson v. California,310 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 746, 84 L. Ed. 1104 (1940).
In the latter case an ordinance prohibiting picketing was involved. The court
held that such ordinance was in violation of "the liberty of communication secured
by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by a state."
In A. F. L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321, 61 Sup. Ct. 568, 85 L. Ed. 855 the
court again held that there may be peaceful picketing even though there be no
immediate employer-employee dispute. This right of peaceful picketing under
the Fourteenth Amendment was advanced one more step by the court sustaining
the right of a union to express its grievance in a labor matter by picketing even
though no "labor dispute" existed under the state law. Bakery Driver's Local v.
Wohl, 315 U. S.769, 62 Sup. Ct. 816, 86 L. Ed. 1178 (1941).
Up to this point the court had made no limitation on the right of picketing
as it had in the ordinary cases involving freedom of speech. Whitney v. People
of California, 274 U. S. 357, 47 Sup. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095. However on the
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same day that the Swing case was decided the court imposed its fir-t limitation on
the "constitutional right of picketing." Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U. S. 287, 61 Sup. Ct. 552, 85 L. Ed. 836, (1941). In this
case a strike had been called by the union and acts of considerable violence had
taken place while the employer was being picketed. However these acts of violence had taken place about five years before the injunctive relief was sought. At
the time the proceedings were before the court there was no evidence that such
acts of violence were still continuing. The court nevertheless sustained the injunction of the state court. In the course of his opinion Frankfurter, J. said:
"The issuance of an injunction restraining peaceful picketing does not involve an infringement of the constitutional right of free speech so long as previous
acts of violence neither episodic nor isolated by members of the picketing union
or their sympathizers give to continued picketing, even though peacefully carried
on a coercive effect."
Although some limitations on this right are desirable, it would seem that
the test laid down by the court leaves something to be desired since the primary
purpose of all picketing is to coerce the employer into accepting the demands
of the union. The presence of violence in the course of picketing should be considered by the court in determining whether an injunction should be granted
but the test of continuing the injunction should be whether there is a likelihood
of the continuance of the illegal acts. See U. S. v. Railway Employees Dept.
A. F. L., 283 Fed. 479, Vaughn v. Kansas City Moving Picture Operators' Union,
36 Fed. 2d 78.
In Carpenter and Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U. S. 722, 62 Sup. Ct.
807, 86 L. Ed. 1143, (1942), it was held that picketing may be restricted to the
area of the industry within which the labor dispute arises. This further limitation
by the court was met by a vigorous dissent on the part of several members of the
court. But Justice Black in dissenting said: "We do not doubt the right of the
state to impose not only some but reasonable restrictions upon peaceful picketing.
Reasonable numbers, quietness, truthful placards, suitable hours not destructive
of the right to tell of labor difficulties may be required." This latter statement
would seem to afford labor with a fairly broad pattern for picketing and at the
same time to protect the employer from unreasonable conduct on the part of the
pickets.
In the instant case the court held that peaceful picketing would be protected
even though no sanction had been given to it by state statute. The cases that
previously were before the court in every instance involved the constitutionality
of a statute either sanctioning picketing in certain specified instance or prohibiting picketing absolutely. Notwithstanding the absence of such a statute the
court held that the union May peacefully picket the 'employer in pursuance of its
constitutional privilege to do so.
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In conclusion it is interesting to note that the court in this case refused to
grant the injunction even though there were some matters that were enjoinable.
It had been previously settled by the court that they would enjoin representations
of fact that were untrue but would not do so in the case of expressions of opinion
to the effect that the respondents were aiding the cause of facism and that they
were unfair to labor as well as representations of fact. In contrast to the Meadowmoor case the court refused to enjoin all the picketing even though the false
representations of fact were enjoinable. It will be recalled that in the Meadowmoor case the court enjoined all the picketing by the union even though the enjoinable acts could have been separated from the ones that were not. The view
of the court in this case undoubtedly is the one to be preferred if we are to give
to picketing the constitutional protection it has won and rightly deserves.
JOHN J. SCHATT

